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DTG 221329Z JUN 10 (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 403-1(l)

FROM

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SERIAL: (U) [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424

BODY

PASS: (U) [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(6)

SUBJ: [REDACTED] ISRAELI TRAINING FOR TURKISH HERON UAS OPERATORS CEASES FOLLOWING FREE GAZA FLOTILLA (U//FOUO). WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~

DOI: (U) 20100611.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE:

SOURCE A.

1. (U//FOUO) DESCRIPTION -- //OPEN SOURCE//FIRAT NEW AGENCY. TURKISH-LANGUAGE KURDISH COVERAGE PRO PKK ONLINE NEWSPAPER. DATE OF SOURCE: 20100611.
2. (U//FOUO) CONTEXT STATEMENT -- PRO-KURDISH NEWS AGENCY THAT CLOSELY TRACKS TURKISH MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST OF TURKEY. SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW. TEXT: 1. (U//FOUO) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. FOLLOWING THE FREE GAZA FLOTILLA ON 31 MAY 2010, THE ISRAELI TRAINING FOR TURKISH AIR FORCE HERON UAS OPERATORS CEASED. IN ADDITION, A TURKISH DELEGATION THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO TRAVEL TO ISRAEL TO TEST HERON UASS HAS CANCELLED ITS VISIT.
2. (U//FOUO) FOLLOWING THE FREE GAZA FLOTILLA, THE TWO ISRAELI HERON UAS OPERATORS WHO WERE TRAINING THE TURKISH AIR FORCE HOW TO OPERATE THE HERON UAS IN BATMAN, TURKEY HAVE LEFT TO RETURN TO ISRAEL. ADDITIONALLY, A TURKISH DELEGATION THAT WAS SCHEDULED TO TRAVEL TO ISRAEL OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO TEST ADDITIONAL HERON UASS HAS CANCELLED ITS VISIT TO ISRAEL. TO DATE, ISRAEL HAS DELIVERED SIX OF

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
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(b)(3):10 USC 424

TEN HERON UASS TO TURKEY. [REDACTED] IT IS UNKNOWN WHETHER ISRAEL PLANS TO DELIVER THE REMAINING FOUR HERON UASS TO TURKEY).



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COLL: (U) [REDACTED]

INSTR: (U) [REDACTED]

PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

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DRV FROM: [REDACTED]

DECL: [REDACTED]

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(b)(3):10-USC 424

(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)
(3):50 USC 403-1(i), 1.4 (c)

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211403Z JUL 10

FROM

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(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

CONTROLS

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(b)(3):10
USC 424

SERIAL

(b)(3):10
USC 424

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) ISRAEL (ISR).

IPSP: (U)

SUBJ:

WORLDWIDE MEDIA REACTION TO OPERATIONS ~~(U//FOUO)~~

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

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DOI: (U) 20100621.

REQS: (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE:

(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)
(3):50 USC 403-1(i)

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

TEXT: 1. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF)
WILL INTRODUCE PUBLIC RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL-WORLD MEDIA OPINION
INTO FUTURE WAR GAME SCENARIOS.

2. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ AS OF NEXT YEAR, THE
SENIOR ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) COMMAND WILL HOLD STRATEGIC
EXERCISES AT THE MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC
RELATIONS-INFORMATION LEVELS. THIS SPECIAL TRAINING, AIMED AT BETTER
COPING WITH THE OPERATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA,
WILL UTILIZE THE NEWLY MAFAT-DEVELOPED SIMULATOR.

MAFAT IS AN ACRONYM IN BOTH ENGLISH AND HEBREW, USING THE
FIRST LETTERS OF THE WORDS IN HEBREW WHICH ARE TRANSLATED AS
ADMINISTRATION OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF FIGHTING MEANS AND
TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, OR KNOWN BY ITS SHORTER NAME IN

(b)(3):10
USC 424


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
(b)(3): 10 USC 424, (b)
(3): 50 USC 403-1(i)

ENGLISH, DEFENSE R-D). THE FIRST SYSTEM HAS BEEN INTRODUCED INTO THE
DADO INSTITUTE FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY MILITARY THOUGHT TO REINFORCE
CERTAIN ASPECTS AMONG SENIOR STRATEGIC OFFICERS.




THE EVENT WHERE
ISRAELI SPECIAL FORCES MEMBERS BOARDED THE SHIP MAVI MARMARA ON 31
MAY 2010 AS IT WAS ATTEMPTING TO BREAK THE [REDACTED] SIEGE ON GAZA
[REDACTED] NINE ACTIVISTS WERE KILLED, EIGHT OF THEM TURKISH, DURING
THE ENSUING INCIDENT.

(b)(3): 10 USC
424, (b)(3): 50
USC 403-1(i)



(b)(1), (b)(3): 50 USC
403-1(i), 1.4 (c)



(b)(1), (b)(3): 10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)


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(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)



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COLL: (U)

INSTR: (U)

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U)

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

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DRV FROM:

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(b)(3):10
USC 424

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)
(3):50 USC 403-1(l), 1.4 (c)

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USC 424

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201033Z SEP 10 USC 403-1(l)

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(b)(3):10 USC 424

DOCNO

SERIAL: (U) [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) TURKEY (TUR); ISRAEL (ISR).

IPSP: (U) [REDACTED] (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJ: [REDACTED] TURKISH ACADEMIC'S ARTICLE ON TURKEY AND ISRAEL - STRATEGIC PARTNERS IN DISCORD (U//FOUO);

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

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DOI: (U) 20100801

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

(b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE:

SOURCE A.

1. (U) DESCRIPTION -- //OPEN SOURCE//OPEN SOURCE. DEFENSE TURKEY IS AN ENGLISH LANGUAGE PUBLICATION THAT INTRODUCES DEFENSE SALES, CONTRACTS AND DEVELOPMENTS PERTAINING TO TURKEY. IT IS AIMED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCE. DATE OF SOURCE: 20100801.

2. (U) CONTEXT STATEMENT -- RECEIVED OPEN SOURCE PUBLICATION THROUGH OFFICIAL DUTIES.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

ENCLOSURES

TEXT: 1. (U//FOUO) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. THE ENCLOSURE IS AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED BY DR. OSMAN FARUK ((LOGOGLU)), A BOARD MEMBER OF THE STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER OF THE TURKISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND A MEMBER OF THE TURKEY CHANGE MOVEMENT (TURKIYE DEGISIM HAREKETI). THE ARTICLE DETAILS HOW THE STRATEGIC LINK BETWEEN TURKEY AND ISRAEL HAS BEEN BADLY BROKEN TO THE DETRIMENT OF PEACE, SECURITY, AND STABILITY IN THE CRITICAL REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST. WITH THE DETERIORATION OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP, TURKEY HAS IN EFFECT REMOVED ITSELF FROM THE EQUATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS WHILE ISRAEL HAS DEPRIVED ITSELF OF THE HELP OF PERHAPS THE MOST

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page 22

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RELIABLE AND POWERFUL FRIEND IN ITS REGION. THE BI-LATERAL AND BROADER CONSEQUENCES OF THE LOSS OF TRUST AND MUTUALITY BETWEEN TURKEY AND ISRAEL WILL BE FAR-REACHING AND ENDURING UNLESS REVERSED WITH A SUSTAINED EFFORT BY BOTH COUNTRIES.

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) TURKEY WAS THE FIRST MUSLIM COUNTRY TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S STATEHOOD AND MAINTAINED UNINTERRUPTED DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH ISRAEL DESPITE THE PRESSURE OF ARAB STATES AND THE STRAINS OF VICISSITUDES EXPERIENCED OVER TIME IN THEIR OWN RELATIONS. IN THE 1990S THE RELATIONSHIP BEGAN TO FLOURISH IN THE POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND COMMERCIAL SPHERES. AFTER THE SIGNING OF A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT IN 1997, TRADE VOLUME INCREASED BY SEVEN FOLD TO A LEVEL OF MORE THAN 3 BILLION USD PER YEAR. ISRAELI TOURISTS CAME TO TURKEY IN LARGE NUMBERS, AND HIGH-LEVEL DIPLOMATIC VISITS WERE FREQUENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS POSITIVE TREND CONTINUED UNTIL THE 2008 ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST HAMAS IN THE GAZA STRIP.

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) FROM THAT POINT ON, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT EXHIBITED AN INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ATTITUDE TOWARD ISRAEL. THERE WAS THE WELL-KNOWN "ONE MINUTE" OUTBURST IN DAVOS. FOLLOWING ISRAEL'S ATTACK AT THE END OF MAY 2010 ON THE AID FLOTILLA, TURKEY WITHDREW ITS AMBASSADOR AND RELATIONS HIT THEIR LOWEST POINT. IT CONDITIONED THE RESUMPTION OF NORMAL RELATIONS ON A SERIES OF DEMANDS. TURKEY IS ASKING FOR AN APOLOGY FROM ISRAEL, COMPENSATION TO THE FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED, ISRAEL AGREEING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UN-LED INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT, THE RETURN OF THE DETAINED SHIPS, AND THE LIFTING OF THE NAVAL BLOCKADE AGAINST GAZA. SO FAR, ISRAEL HAS ONLY TAKEN SOME LIMITED STEPS TOWARDS THE LOOSENING OF THE BLOCKADE IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESSURE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THERE IS NO INDICATION NOW THAT ISRAEL INTENDS TO MEET ANY OF TURKEY'S DEMANDS. GIVEN THE CURRENT DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFIGURATIONS IN THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE CHANCES OF NORMALIZATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE ARE QUITE DIM. AT PRESENT, THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IS ACRIMONIOUS.

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) ACCORDING TO DR. LOGOGLU, THE REASON THE RELATIONSHIP HAS REGRESSED SO DEEPLY HAS A LOT TO DO WITH THE QUESTIONABLE POLICIES PURSUED BY ISRAEL. HOWEVER, IT ALSO HAS A LOT TO DO WITH THE PARADIGM SHIFT IN TURKISH SOCIETY, PROPELLED AND GUIDED BY THE PARTICULAR OUTLOOK OF THE RULING JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY (AKP) ON DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THIS SHIFT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEING CRITICAL OF ISRAEL ON THE ONE HAND AND BEING ANTI-ISRAEL ON THE OTHER.

5. (U//~~FOUO~~) ONE DIMENSION THAT IS LIKELY TO SUFFER THE MOST FROM THIS DOWNWARD SPIRAL IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ISRAEL IS

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THE DEFENSE-MILITARY COMPONENT OF THE BI-LATERAL RELATIONSHIP. THE DEFENSE COOPERATION STARTED IN EARNEST IN MID-1990 WHEN TURKEY AND ISRAEL SIGNED TWO SEPARATE AGREEMENTS. THE FIRST (FEB 96) WAS ON MILITARY AND THE SECOND (AUG 96) WAS ON COOPERATION IN DEFENSE INDUSTRIES. BOTH AGREEMENTS SET UP THEIR OWN FOLLOW-UP AND MONITORING MECHANISMS THAT MET REGULARLY. IN THE YEARS FROM 1996 ON, HUNDREDS OF ISRAELI OFFICERS CAME TO TURKEY AND MANY TURKISH OFFICERS RECEIVED TRAINING IN ISRAEL.

6. (U//~~FOUO~~) DURING THE PERIOD OF 1996 TO 2008, THE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGES BLOSSOMED INTO A ROBUST AND COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP, DUBBED AS A "STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP". THERE WERE MORE THAN TWENTY MAJOR PROJECTS, INCLUDING THE MODERNIZATION AND UPGRADING OF F-4 AND F-5 JET AIRCRAFT, M-60 TANKS AND HELICOPTERS. TURKEY BECAME A LUCRATIVE MARKET FOR ISRAELI MILITARY PRODUCTS SUCH AS ROCKETS AND UNMANNED AIRCRAFT AS WELL AS ADVANCED MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. BOTH SIDES BENEFITED FROM THIS RELATIONSHIP--TURKEY WAS GETTING HIGH QUALITY PRODUCTS; ISRAELI WAS EARNING MONEY. ONE PARTICULAR ADVANTAGE FOR TURKEY WAS THAT ISRAEL WAS PROVIDING CRITICAL HIGH-TECH PRODUCTS THAT THE U.S. AND OTHER ALLIES WERE UNWILLING TO SELL TO TURKEY. A GAIN OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE FOR ISRAEL WAS THAT IT WAS ENJOYING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COMFORT OF HAVING SUCH A STRONG BOND IN DEFENSE MATTERS WITH A HEAVYWEIGHT LIKE TURKEY, REDUCING ITS SENSE OF ISOLATION IN THE REGION.

7. (U//~~FOUO~~) THE MILITARY COOPERATION ENCOMPASSED A RANGE OF DIFFERENT ACTIVITIES. THERE WERE JOINT NAVAL EXERCISES AND SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE U.S. AND OBSERVERS FROM JORDAN. IN ADDITION, THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE ENJOYED THE PRIVILEGE OF TRAINING ITS AIR FORCE PILOTS AT FACILITIES OFFERED BY TURKEY, AN IMPORTANT PRIVILEGE FOR ISRAEL WITH ITS EXTREMELY LIMITED AIRSPACE. IN THE SAME VEIN, TURKEY INVITED ISRAEL TO PARTICIPATE IN AIR FORCE DRILLS ALONG WITH NATO MEMBERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHILE WE CANNOT KNOW THE EXACT EXTENT OF INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, WE CAN SAFELY STATE THE TWO SIDES HAVE OVER THE YEARS ENGAGED IN A HEALTHY EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE OVER A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES. ISRAEL PURCHASED UNIFORMS, BOOTS, AND SIMILAR SUPPLIES FROM TURKEY. TURKEY AND ISRAEL ALSO WORKED TOGETHER IN JOINT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS CONCERNING DEFENSE-RELATED ISSUES.

8. (U//~~FOUO~~) THE TURKISH RESPONSE TO THE FLOTILLA ATTACK HAS BEEN PRIMARILY IN THE MILITARY DEFENSE FIELD. TURKEY IMMEDIATELY CANCELLED THREE DIFFERENT JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES AND CALLED OFF A LONG-PLANNED AIR DRILL AT THE LAST MINUTE TO PREVENT ISRAEL'S

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PARTICIPATION. A NUMBER OF MILITARY CONTRACTS IN THE PIPELINE HAVE BEEN PUT IN DEEP FREEZE, IF NOT ALTOGETHER CANCELLED. CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS HAVE COME TO A HALT. INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION MAY HAVE ENDED, EVEN BEFORE THE FLOTILLA ATTACK I WAS TOLD (MAY 6, 2010) BY AN ISRAELI GENERAL AT A CONFERENCE AT NETANYA COLLEGE THAT THE LEVEL OF MILITARY COOPERATION HAD ALREADY BEEN REDUCED TO A MINIMUM IN THE LAST TWO YEARS. FROM A PROJECTED VOLUME OF ABOUT 2 BILLION USD, THE DEFENSE CONTRACTS SHRUNK TO LESS THAN 100 MILLION USD IN 2007 AND 2008.

9. (U//~~FOUO~~) WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT THE TURKISH-ISRAELI MILITARY AND DEFENSE CONNECTION HAS ALREADY SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE, A COMPONENT DEPENDENT ON THE STATE OF POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAS PAINTED ITSELF INTO A CORNER THOUGH IT COULD AND SHOULD HAVE MANAGED THE TENSIONS WITH ISRAEL WITH WISDOM AND MODERATION, RATHER THAN EMOTION AND ANGER. ON THE OTHER HAND, ISRAEL MADE THE MISTAKE OF NOT RESPONDING MORE FLEXIBLY TO TURKISH DEMANDS AFTER THE FLOTILLA INCIDENT AND WRONGLY ASSUMED IT COULD AFFORD TO ALIENATE TURKEY. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PROSPECT OF RECOVERY OF TRUST AND MUTUALITY BETWEEN TURKEY AND ISRAEL IS VERY DISTANT INDEED. THE TURKISH-ISRAELI STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP PROVIDED A CUSHION OF STABILITY FOR THE WHOLE AREA. NOW THAT COMFORT ZONE IS GONE. THIS DOES NOT AUGUR WELL FOR THE REGION. A FUNCTIONAL TURKISH-ISRAELI STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP IS PERHAPS OF GREATER IMPORTANCE FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE REGION THAN IT IS FOR THE TWO COUNTRIES THEMSELVES. WITH ISRAEL NO LONGER ENJOYING THE GOODWILL OF TURKEY, IRAN MIGHT FEEL MORE EMBOLDENED WITH ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION, WHICH IN TURN MIGHT TRIGGER A RADICAL RESPONSE FROM ISRAEL. TURKEY IS UNFORTUNATELY NO LONGER AN ARBITER IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, BUT ALMOST A PARTY TO IT. HENCE, THE MIDDLE EAST REGION IS TODAY PREGNANT TO FURTHER INSTABILITIES. THIS MAKES A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND ISRAEL ALL THE MORE URGENT.

10. (U//~~FOUO~~) THE ATTACHED ENCLOSURE CONTAINS THE ORIGINAL, COMPLETE ARTICLE. COMMENTS [REDACTED] 1. (U//~~FOUO~~) OF INTEREST WAS DR. LOGOGLU'S STATEMENT

(b)(3):10
USC 424.

T THAT "EVEN BEFORE THE FLOTILLA ATTACK I WAS TOLD (MAY 6, 2010) BY AN ISRAELI GENERAL AT A CONFERENCE AT NETANYA COLLEGE THAT THE LEVEL OF MILITARY COOPERATION HAD ALREADY BEEN REDUCED TO A MINIMUM IN THE LAST TWO YEARS." THIS INFORMATION CORROBORATES OTHER REPORTING (SEE NEXT PARAGRAPH FOR THE LISTING OF IIRS) THAT TURKEY'S RULING JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY (AKP) INTENTIONALLY TRIGGERED THE FLOTILLA INCIDENT WITH ISRAEL IN ORDER TO DEVELOP A

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
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page 25

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(b)(1), (b)(3): 10 USC 424, (b)
(3): 50 USC 403-1(i), 1.4 (c)



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USC 424, (b)
(3): 50- USC
403-1(i)

ADMIN

COLL: (U) [redacted]

INSTR: (U) [redacted] (b)(3): 10 USC 424

PREP: (U) [redacted]

ENCL: (U) TO FOLLOW - 1 ENCLOSURES,

1. DIGITAL, DOCUMENT - (U//~~FOUO~~) TURKEY AND ISRAEL - STRATEGIC
PARTNERS IN DISCORD, 1 / PDF FILE / 2 PGS, IN ENGLISH, 20100801

(U//~~FOUO~~)

ACQ: (U) [redacted]

(b)(3): 10 USC 424

DISSEM: [redacted]

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

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DRV FROM: [REDACTED]

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
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OSMAN FARUK LOĞOĞLU
AMBASSADOR (ret)

Dr. Loğoğlu (born in Ankara, 1941) retired from public service in 2006 after thirty-five years in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Following his work as Special Adviser to the Foreign Minister (1990-1993), he was appointed Turkey's Ambassador to Copenhagen, Denmark (1993-1996) and subsequently transferred to Baku, Azerbaijan (1996-1998). Ambassador Loğoğlu became Deputy Undersecretary for multilateral political affairs in 1998. He then served as Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry from 2000 until his posting as Ambassador of Turkey to Washington D.C., USA in 2001 where he stayed until the end of 2005. He attended Brandeis University, did his doctorate in Political Science at Princeton University and was a lecturer in Political Science at Middlebury College, 1969-1970. He is the author of *İsmet İnönü and the Making of Modern Turkey*, a book about the times and life of the second President of the Turkish Republic. He has published articles on foreign affairs in both Turkish and English languages in different journals. Dr. Loğoğlu served as President of the think-tank of Turkey, the Eurasian Strategic Studies Center (ASAM) for two years (2006-2008). He was the Deputy Chairman of the Turkish National Commission for UNESCO (2006-2010). He is on the Board of the Strategic Studies Center of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a member of the Turkey Change Movement (Türkiye Değişim Hareketi).

“Turkey and Israel: Strategic Partners in Discord”

The strategic link between Turkey and Israel has been badly broken to the detriment of peace, security and stability in the critical region of the Middle East.

With the deterioration of their relationship, Turkey has in effect removed itself from the equation of the Middle East peace process while Israel has deprived itself of the help of perhaps the most reliable and powerful friend in its region. The bilateral and broader consequences of the loss of trust and mutuality between Turkey and Israel will be far-reaching and enduring, unless reversed with a sustained effort by both countries.

The shared history of the Turkish and Jewish peoples is rich and singularly positive. They have enjoyed friendly ties throughout history and the Turks have helped the Jewish people in their times of difficulty and hardship. Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel's statehood and maintained uninterrupted diplomatic ties with Israel despite the pressure of the Arab states and the strains and vicissitudes experienced over time in their own relations. In the 1990s, the relationship began to flourish in the political, military, economic and commercial spheres. After the signing of a free trade agreement in 1997, trade volume increased by seven fold to a level of more than 3 billion US dollars per annum. Israeli tourists came to Turkey in large numbers. There were frequent high-level diplomatic visits

between the two countries. This positive trend prevailed until about 2008.

However, things began to deteriorate rapidly in the aftermath of the Israeli military operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in late 2008. From that point on, the Turkish Government exhibited an increasingly critical attitude toward Israel. There was the well-known “one-minute” outburst in Davos. Following Israel's attack at the end of May (2010) on the aid flotilla, Turkey withdrew its Ambassador and relations hit their lowest point. It conditioned the resumption of normal relations on a series of demands.

Turkey is asking for an apology from Israel, compensation to the families of those killed, Israel agreeing to the establishment of an UN-led international investigation of the incident, the return of the detained ships and the lifting of the naval blockade against Gaza. So far, Israel has only taken some limited steps towards the loosening of the blockade in response to the pressure from the international community. There is no indication now that Israel intends to meet any of Turkey's demands. Given the current domestic political configurations in the two countries, the chances of normalization in the near future are quite dim. At present, the political atmosphere is acrimonious.

Why the relationship has regressed so deeply has a lot to do with the questionable policies pursued by Israel.

However, it also has a lot to do with the paradigm shift in Turkish society, propelled and guided by the particular outlook of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) on domestic and foreign affairs. This shift is responsible for the difference between being critical of Israel on the one hand and being anti-Israel on the other.

One dimension that is likely to suffer the most from this downward spiral in the relations between Turkey and Israel is the defense-military component in the bilateral relationship. The defense cooperation started in earnest in mid-1990 when Turkey and Israel signed two separate agreements. The first (February 1996) was on military training. The second (August 1996) was on cooperation in defense industries.

Both agreements set up their own follow-up and monitoring mechanisms that met regularly. In the years from 1996 on, hundreds of Israeli officers came to Turkey and many Turkish officers received training in Israel.

During the period 1996-2008, the military-to-military exchanges blossomed into a robust and complex relationship, dubbed as a "strategic partnership". There were more than twenty major projects, including the modernization and upgrading of F-4 and F-5 jet aircraft, M-60 tanks and helicopters. Turkey became a lucrative market for Israeli military products such as rockets and unmanned aircraft as well as advanced military technology. Both sides benefited from this relationship.

Turkey was getting high quality products; Israel was earning money. One particular advantage for Turkey was that Israel was providing critical high-tech products that the US and other allies were unwilling to sell to Turkey.

A gain of special importance for Israel was that it was enjoying the psychological comfort of having such a strong bond in defense matters with a heavyweight like Turkey, reducing its sense of isolation in the region.

The military cooperation encompassed a range of different activities. There were joint naval exercises and search and rescue operations in the eastern Mediterranean with the participation of the US and observers from Jordan. In addition, Israeli air force enjoyed the privilege of training its air force pilots at facilities offered by Turkey, an important privilege for Israel with its extremely limited airspace. In the same vein, Turkey invited Israel to participate in air force drills along with NATO members. On the other hand, while we cannot know the exact extent of intelligence cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries, we can safely state that two sides have over the years engaged in a healthy exchange of intelligence over a wide range of issues. Israel purchased uniforms, boots and similar supplies from Turkey. Turkey and Israel also worked together in joint research and development projects concerning defense-related issues.

The Turkish response to the flotilla attack has been primarily in the military-defense field. Turkey immediately cancelled three different joint military exercises and called off a long-planned air drill at the last minute to prevent Israel's participation. A number of military contracts in the pipeline have been put in deep freeze, if not altogether cancelled. Consultative mechanisms have come to a halt. Intelligence cooperation may have ended. Even before the flotilla attack I was told (May

6, 2010) by an Israeli general at a conference at Netanya College that the level of military cooperation had already been reduced to a minimum in the last two years. From a projected volume of about 2 billion US dollars, the defense contracts shrunk to less than 100 million in 2007-2008.

What is clear is that the Turkish-Israeli military and defense connection has already suffered severe damage, a component dependent on the state of political relations between the two countries. The Turkish Government has painted itself into a corner though it could and should have managed the tensions with Israel with wisdom and moderation, rather than emotion and anger. On the other hand, Israel made the mistake of not responding more flexibly to Turkish demands after the flotilla incident and wrongly assumed it could afford to alienate Turkey. Under the circumstances, the prospect of recovery of trust and mutuality between Turkey and Israel is very distant indeed. The Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership provided a cushion of stability for the whole area. Now that comfort zone is gone. This does not augur well for the region. A functional Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership is perhaps of greater importance for the Arab states of the region than it is for the two countries themselves. With Israel no longer enjoying the goodwill of Turkey, Iran might feel more emboldened with its activities in the region, which in turn might trigger a radical response from Israel. Turkey is unfortunately no longer an arbiter in the Middle East conflict, but almost a party to it. Hence, the Middle East region is today pregnant to further instabilities. This makes a rapprochement between Turkey and Israel all the more urgent.

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DTG (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)
220644Z SEP 11 (3):50 USC 403-1(i)
FROM
FM [REDACTED]

CONTROLS
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QQQQ

DOCNO (b)(3):10 USC 424
SERIAL: (U) [REDACTED]

BODY (b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)
COUNTRY: (U) ISRAEL (ISR); TURKEY (TUR)
IPSP: (U) [REDACTED]
SUBJ: [REDACTED]

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DOI: (U) 20110914 (b)(3):10 USC 424
REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)
(3):50 USC 403-1(i), 1.4 (c)

[REDACTED]

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.
TEXT: 1. (U//FOUO) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. TURKEY HAS RECENTLY EXPELLED
ALL ISRAELI DIPLOMATS ABOVE THE LEVEL OF SECOND SECRETARY, LEAVING

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DIPLOMAT IN THE ISRAELI EMBASSY. [REDACTED] IS SINGLE AND ARRIVED

(b)(3):10 USC
424, (b)(3):50
USC 403-1(i)

~~NOFORN~~
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~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3): 10 USC 424, (b)
(3): 50 USC 403-1(l)


(b)(3): 10 USC
424, (b)(3): 50
USC-403-1(l)

[REDACTED] HE LACKS EXPERIENCE BECAUSE THIS IS HIS [REDACTED] FOREIGN
POSTING. INTERESTINGLY [REDACTED] IS FROM NORTHERN ISRAEL AND IS A

(b)(6)

[REDACTED] THE ISRAELI DEFENSE
ATTACHE (DATT) WAS IN ISRAEL FOR PRE-PLANNED CONSULTATIONS WHEN THE
ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE, AND HAS NOT RETURNED TO TURKEY. NEGOTIATIONS
ARE UNDERWAY TO RE-DESIGNATE HIM [REDACTED] SO THAT
HE CAN RETURN TO ANKARA.

(b)(3): 10 USC
424, (b)(3): 50
USC 403-1(l)




(b)(1), (b)(3): 10 USC 424, (b)
(3): 50 USC 403-1(l), 1.4 (c)

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(b)(1), (b)(3); 50 USC
403-1(i), 1.4 (c)

ADMIN

COLL: (U)

INSTR: (U)

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U)

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

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(b)(3); 10 USC 424

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